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Objectives. The present paper aims at exploring the relationship between firms’ board structure and their green 
performance, within the agency theory and resource dependence theory frameworks, in order to outline if particular 
types of board directors could act as a stimulating driver for firms’ environmental performance. 
Methodology. The theoretical analysis is completed by an empirical exploration, performed by two linear 
regression models, on a sample of Italian and Spanish firms included in the CSRHub database in 2015. 
Findings. Our findings provide nuanced evidence that boards do affect firms’ environmental performance. We 
reported in fact a positive relationship between the presence of non- executive directors in the board and companies’ 
environmental performance; while the critical mass of women directors and the percentage of independent directors, 
together with board size, do not seem to be related with firms’ green performance. 
Research limits. The study employs a sample with a limited number of observations. Moreover, a longitudinal 
analysis will probably provide more confidence in the findings. 
Practical implications. The results allow to identify the characteristics of the board that may foster and enforce 
firms’ environmental performance. Moreover, socially responsible funds could find useful, for their portfolio allocation 
strategy, to know if there are types of directors more oriented to green issues. 
Originality of the study. There is a lack of literature on the theme. The study is one of the few attempts that is not 
focused on Anglo-Saxon countries or single developing countries and that concentrates on environmental issues, 
instead of CSR. 
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Environmental sustainability is a prominent, rapidly growing trend in modern business. It is 
well known that the natural environment and a firm’s operations are reciprocally related (Boutilier, 
2011). In particular, companies may play a crucial role in order to reduce the global environmental 
impact of the present society (Carballo-Penela and Castromán-Diz, 2014); that’s why the 
commitment to the natural environment has become an important variable within the current 
competitive scenarios (Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006) and environmental 
performance is increasingly considered a strategic issue for firms. Organizations may reduce 
environmental impact and manage the interface between business and nature beyond imposed 
compliance changing their strategies in a proactive manner, in order to prevent any potential 
negative impacts on the organizations’ products and services, physical assets, facilities, design, 
delivery, and production processes (Aragon- Correa and Sharma, 2003; Busch, 2011; Delmas et al., 
2011; Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006¸ Sharma, 2000). As there is a growing evidence 
that a proactive environmental strategy may lead to better financial and economic performance, and 
thus potentially to gain a competitive advantage, as well as perceived gains in reputation and risk 
management (Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011; Flammer, 2013; 
Kassinis et al., 2016), such strategy, and in particular its drivers and impact on business 
performance, has been object, in the last few years, of an ongoing debate. 
The Organizations and Natural Environment (ONE) literature has, in fact, extensively 
developed on the drivers of firms’ environmental performance, focusing on a variety of antecedents. 
The shift towards greener practices may be in fact stimulated not only by contextual, or external 
factors, such as regulations, customers and other stakeholders, but also by organizational, or internal 
drivers, such as resources and capabilities, managerial attitude and motivation. 
Several studies focused on organizational drivers have recently explored the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms on firms’ environmental performance and proactivity (Earnhart 
and Lizal, 2006; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Kock et al., 2012; Walls et al., 2012; Ortiz-de-
Mandojana et al., 2012; Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa, 2015; Calza et al., 2016), trying 
to understand if and how these mechanisms may direct managers towards increasing environmental 
performance.  
A large portion of this research considers board structure and composition as a possible driver 
of the firm’s environmental stance (de Villiers et al., 2011; Kock et al., 2012; Post et al., 2015), but 
the few studies addressing the relationship present fragmented and partially contradictory empirical 
evidence (Ben-Amar et al., 2015; Li et al., 2017), highlighting the need for additional research in 
this area. 
The present paper tries therefore to contribute to extant literature by analyzing the relationship 
between corporate board’s structure and firm’s environmental performance, in order to visualize if 
some types of directors could act as a stimulating driver for such performance. In particular, 
founding on the agency and resource dependency theory, we focused the attention on the size of the 
board, together with its gender diversity and independency. 
Using a sample of 87 Italian and Spanish firms, this study highlights the importance of a firm’s 
board in the development of companies’ environmental conducts, advancing knowledge in the 
understanding of the antecedents of such strategies. ONE literature may therefore be enriched by 
the study, identifying other important internal drivers of firms’ environmental performance. 
Moreover, while most of the studies investigating this issue are focused on Anglo-Saxon 
countries, in particular U.S. (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; de Villiers et al., 2011; Kock et al., 
2012; Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa, 2015; Cowden et al., 2015; Post et al., 2015) or 
single developing countries (Meng et al., 2013; Earnhart and Lizal, 2006), our analysis is focused 
on companies belonging to different European non Anglo-Saxon countries (in particular Italy and 
Spain), where majority ownership structures prevail. Controlling shareholders influence board 
member selection and may use their power to meaningfully influence the board to advance their 
preferences, so we can expect to have different results from previous studies which are mostly 
HOW GREEN IS YOU BOARD? BOARD STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
579 
dedicated to firms without controlling shareholders, in particular as regards the benefits of board 
independency. Our results could be therefore relevant also for corporate governance literature on 
board dynamics and influence on corporate strategies. 
Finally, as our measure of environmental performance covers other countries all over the 
world, our findings on the relationship between firms’ board and environmental performance may 
have implications in other countries and could stimulate future comparative analyses. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews prior studies on 
the relationship between board structure and environmental performance, and it develops the 
research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the adopted methodology. Section 4 shows the 
results of the analysis, while in the final part of the paper a formal discussion of the implications of 
the results and the main findings and limitations of the study are summarized. 
 
 
2. Boards of directors and firms’ environmental performance: conceptual foundations and 
research hypotheses 
 
The Organizations and the Natural Environment literature has already recognized that the 
introduction of environmental friendly activities may be used by companies to gain competitive 
advantage toward competitors, enhancing their position in the market and developing the resources 
and capabilities useful for building a long term profit potential (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Buysse and 
Verbeke, 2003; Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003). Such benefits are especially visible when firms 
are trying to anticipate future regulations and trends, in order to prevent (instead of simply correct) 
negative environmental impacts, following proactive environmental strategies (PES) (Aragon-
Correa and Sharma, 2003). Firms with high environmental performance may in fact reduce 
operating costs, improve access to resources and take advantage of market opportunities created by 
an increasing demand for environmental friendly goods and services (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 
2009), in addition to managing risk, including reputational risk. 
Consequently, a number of scholars from different fields of study, have tried to identify and 
analyze the drivers that may encourage a company to develop and sustain its environmental 
performance. 
Prior studies have classified environmental drivers in organizational, or internal, and 
contextual, or external (Ghobadian et al., 1998; Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006; 
Claver et al., 2007). Essentially, environmental regulation (Ambec and Barla, 2006; Bansal and 
Roth, 2000; Majumdar and Marcus, 2001) and stakeholder pressure (Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; 
Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; Garcés-Ayerbe et al., 2012) represent the external factors, while 
companies’ structural features, together with organisational resources and capabilities (Hunt and 
Auster, 1990; Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-Benito, 2006), managerial attitude and motivation 
(Fernández et al., 1996; Hunt and Auster, 1990), leadership capability (Azzone and Noci, 1998) and 
intellectual capital (Claver et al., 2007) constitute the internal ones, all moderated by the presence 
and strength of ethical attitude (Husted, 2005). 
Among the antecedents, a recently growing stream of literature has examined the linkages 
between corporate governance issues and firms’ environmental performance, challenging the role of 
ownership structure as well as board composition, but the few studies on the issue have provided 
fragmented and contradictory evidence, which makes theory building difficult and asks for other 
studies on the theme. 
Most of the papers have their roots in the agency problem caused by the separation between 
management and ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and are 
focused on “how some corporate governance mechanisms resolve the divergence of interests 
between firm owners (principal) and managers (agent) with respect to environmental practices” 
(Kock et al, 2012, p. 493). 
In particular, the linkages between board structure and composition and corporate 
environmental performance (de Villiers et al., 2011; Kock et al., 2012; Ortiz-de-Mandojana and 
Aragon-Correa, 2015; Cowden et al., 2015; Post et al., 2015) have been exploited, based on the idea 
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that boards are responsible for decisions related to CSR and sustainability (Ingley, 2008) that 
usually require important investments and have long term strategic implications (Walls et al., 
2012); a corporate board, in fact, develops stakeholder oriented corporate policies, approves annual 
budgets for sustainability related spending and may create separate standing committees dealing 
with CSR matters (Chang et al., 2017). 
A more developed literature is focused on the effects of corporate governance issues on 
corporate social responsibility and performance (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Dam and Scholtens, 
2012; Fernandez Sanchez et al., 2011; Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995; Setò-Pamies, 2015), but in 
these studies the environment represents only a single dimension of the complex nature of CSR, 
leading the researchers to narrow the attention on environmental issues. 
As regards the relation between boards and firms’ environmental performance, the debate is 
still open, with most of the studies focused on Anglo-Saxon countries, in particular U.S. (de Villiers 
et al., 2011; Kock et al., 2012; Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa, 2015; Cowden et al., 2015; 
Post et al., 2015). 
Several studies are concentrated on the board’s ability to create ties and relations with the 
external environment through board interlocks. The influence of director interlocks on the value 
generated by the social capital of the board may, in fact, improve corporate environmental 
performance (Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa, 2015). Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al. (2012), in 
particular, reported that board interlocks may enhance or inhibit the adoption of PES: director 
interlocks with firms providing knowledge-intensive business services are beneficial for the 
adoption of PES, while those with fossil fuel suppliers and financial institutions are found to be 
negatively related. Moreover, such mechanisms seem positively connected also with the 
environmental performance, especially when a firm is linked to a larger parent company and in case 
of low and high levels of interlock diversity (Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa, 2015). Less 
attention has, instead, been given to the analysis of corporate board structure and composition. 
Kassinis and Vafeas (2006) found that board size and the presence of executive members on the 
board are positively related to environmental litigation, while Kock et al. (2012) reported a positive 
association between the environmental performance of a firm and the presence of pro-stakeholder 
directors in the board. A direct relationship was also found in case of presence of independent 
directors, legal experts and board size (de Villiers et al., 2011). Post et al. (2015) reinforced the 
previous results finding a positive relation between the representation of women and independent 
directors on a firm’s board and sustainability-themed alliances. Such alliances, in turn, positively 
contribute to corporate environmental performance. In the same direction, the analysis of Rao et al. 
(2012) found a significant positive relationship between the extent of environmental reporting and 
the proportions of independent and female directors on a board. 
Our aim is, therefore, to extend previous literature, trying to understand if board size and 
different types of director could influence the orientation of a firm towards environmental issues 
and testing our hypotheses on a sample of Spanish and Italian firms, with ownership structures 
which are more concentrated than Anglo-Saxon firms. Thus, employing the hypotheses used by 
previous studies on the topic, our paper wants to provide a greater view on the effectiveness of 
board of directors on sustainability. 
As Hillman and Dalziel (2003) and de Villiers et al. (2011) pointed out, the resource 
dependence theory and the agency theory provide the general theoretical frameworks for analysing 
how the size and the composition of the board can affect firms’ environmental performance. 
Boards, in fact, have usually two functions, namely: providing information and other resources 
(asserted by the resource dependence theorists) and monitoring the management and aligning its 
interests to those of shareholders (followed by the agency theorists). Integrating the two 
perspectives will contribute to a complete understanding of how they may affect firms’ proactive 
environmental strategies and “can help overcome a current myopia within the two streams of 
research” (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, p.383). 
The resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) views 
organisations as operating in an open system and needing to exchange and acquire certain resources 
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to survive, creating a dependency between firms and external environment. In this framework, 
boards are seen positively, as they may provide valuable expertise and capabilities, influence and 
aid in strategy formulation and help in connecting the firm with stakeholders (Ortiz-de-Mandojana 
and Aragon-Correa, 2015). In this way, larger boards, with a variety of directors, may expand 
existing board member networks and contacts and help firms to better understand and respond to 
their stakeholders (Boyd, 1990), also in case of natural environmental issues. Moreover, boards 
with a high number of members are more likely to include experts on specific topics such as 
environmental problems (de Villiers et al., 2011): such directors could provide the expertise to 
manage environmental efforts and take advantage of environmental opportunities that may arise. 
Therefore, following the results of de Villiers et al. (2011), that showed how environmental 
performance tends to be higher in firms with larger boards, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: Larger boards are positively related with firms’ environmental performance. 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) asserted that boards may provide four benefits: advice and 
counselling, legitimacy, channels of communication with the external organizations and preferential 
access to outside elements. To maximize the performance of these functions, Hillman et al. (2000) 
suggested that boards should include a diversity of directors. 
Hence, within the resource dependence theory, diversity in general, and differences in gender in 
particular, may very likely enrich the resources and capabilities of a board, providing unique 
information, experience and knowledge to management for better decision making. That’s why the 
issue of the board’s diversity, in particular, gender diversity, has become increasingly important, 
and the pressure to enhance the presence of female directors on the board seems to constitute a 
global issue, that many countries have started to solve adopting either a coercive, enabling or 
laissez-faire approach (Labelle et al., 2015). 
Female directors are likely to have different educational and professional backgrounds from 
those of male directors, providing broader perspectives and encouraging open discussions which 
may enhance the board to more effectively perform its tasks, especially related to CSR and 
stakeholders (Bear et al., 2010). In this sense, women directors may help consider the implications 
of strategic decisions for a wider range of stakeholders (Byron and Post, 2016). Women on boards 
tend to be more democratic and participative in decision making processes, leading the board to 
achieve better decisions (Bear et al., 2010). 
A large body of research suggests that women’s values are more closely aligned than men’s 
with corporate social responsibility (Zhang et al., 2013; Setò-Pamies, 2015) and, as corporate 
directors, they tend to possess certain psychological characteristics that may make them more 
sensitive to different stakeholders’ claims (Rao and Tilt, 2016), especially in the case of 
environmental CSR. According to Ibrahim and Angelidis (1994), female directors exhibit greater 
responsibilities: in their analysis they found that women are more philanthropically driven and less 
concerned with economic performance. Environmental, ethical, and caring values are likely to 
affect the decision-making process when women assume the power positions usually held by men 
(Post et al., 2015). Further, women are more likely to have a deeper knowledge of soft managerial 
issues (Rao and Tilt, 2016), as they usually hold positions in soft areas, such as human resources, 
marketing and CSR (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2006). 
Following the studies on CSR in general, some researchers found that women have a more 
protective attitude towards the environment in particular (Wehrmeyer and McNeil, 2000) and are 
more likely than males to be ecologically conscious (Park et al., 2012); subsequently, corporations 
with a higher proportion of women on the board showed better environmental performance (Walls 
et al., 2012; Post et al., 2015; Kassinis et al., 2016; Li et al., 2017) and higher levels and quality of 
environmental reporting (Rao et al., 2012; Liao et al., 2015; Ben-Amar et al., 2015). 
Post et al. (2011), addressing different boards diversity characteristics, reported that firms with 
boards composed of three or more female directors received higher KLD environmental strengths 
scores, reinforcing the research based on the critical mass theory (Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al. 
2011). Minorities in the boards are easily marginalized and considered as tokens, if their presence in 
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larger groups is modest, but, as the size of the minority groups increases, they are able to gain trust, 
influence and challenge majorities’ decisions (Bear et al., 2010; Torchia et al., 2011). This effect 
could be more relevant in firms with controlling shareholders with a high influence on board 
selection and composition. A positive relation between a group of at least three women directors 
appointed on a board and environmental disclosure was also reported by Ben-Amar et al. (2015). 
Therefore, following the extant literature in this area, we hypothesize that: 
 
H2: The presence of a critical mass of women directors is positively related to firms’ 
environmental performance. 
 
Following the agency theory framework, the board of directors is an internal control 
mechanism used to ensure that management behaviour is consistent with the owners’ interests 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Such instrument should not only fulfil its 
responsibility in monitoring agents and protecting shareholders, but also, more importantly, in 
managing stakeholders. Board’s directors may, in fact, exert pressures over managers in order to 
have strategies and actions that satisfy shareholders (and stakeholders) interests. Therefore, they 
should be able to influence executive managers to adopt environmental strategies that could help 
firms to obtain a sustainable competitive advantage. An effective control depends, in particular, on 
whether the directors are non executive and independent (professional managers with expertise in 
monitoring activities, who have incentives to exercise control in order to maintain their reputational 
capital), thus able to indeed act on the shareholders’ behalf. Independent directors should be, in fact, 
primarily interested in aligning with stakeholder interests, being more responsive than insiders to 
stakeholder pressures, in order to maintain and enhance their reputation and obtain, in this way, new 
directorships. 
de Villiers et al. (2011) and Post et al. (2015) found, in fact, a positive relation between the 
presence of independent directors and firms’ environmental performance, following other studies 
focused on corporate social responsibility (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995). 
Johnson and Greening (1999), instead, showed that outside director representation was 
positively related to corporate social performance, while Rao et al. (2012) showed that independent 
directors’ representation is positively related to corporate environmental reporting. 
The effects of such types of directors could be visible also in firms with controlling 
shareholders, where large shareholders typically have control in excess of their cash flow rights 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002) and in these situations they might try to expropriate 
wealth at the expense of minority shareholders, causing what it is called a secondary agency 
problem (Young et al., 2008). 
Thus, following the mainstream literature, we hypothesize that: 
 
H3: A higher percentage of non executive directors in the board is positively related with 
firms’ environmental performance. 
 




3. Data and methodology 
 
Data on environmental performance, for selected companies in 2015, was obtained from the 
CSRHub database that represents the world’s largest CSR database providing social, environmental, 
community, and governance ratings on around 16,891 companies from 200 industries in 133 
countries. 
While not as widely used in management as the KLD database, the CSRHub has recently been 
used in the context of social responsibility both in academic (Cruz et al., 2014) and practitioner 
environments (Gidwani, 2013). 
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Combining data from five of the leading socially responsible investment analysis firms and 
over 120 influential nongovernmental organizations, CSRHub database is relatively objective and is 
not based solely on self-reported measures. CSRHub provides data on a number of CSR 
performance dimensions including: environment, customer, community, and governance. To 
calculate each category ranking, CSRHub takes information from its data sources and transforms it 
into a 0 to 100 scale. The higher the rating the better, with 100 as the best rating. 
In particular, in the present research we used the Environment category
1
 of CSRHub, which 
focuses on data on resource management, energy and climate change, and environmental policy and 
reporting as a proxy of environmental performance. 
As regards, instead, the independent variables related to firms’ board structure and 
composition, we collected the data from the companies’ annual reports and corporate governance 
reports 2014, together with Thomson Reuters Datastream Database.  
In particular, we considered the board size (SIZE), as the total number of directors appointed in 
the board, and the percentage non-executive directors (NON-EX) and independent directors (IND) 
present in the board. Gender diversity, in particular women directors’ critical mass, is instead 
measured as a dummy variable assuming value 1 if boards had at least three women directors, 0 
otherwise. 
To test the hypotheses we also selected a set of control variables, already identified and used in 
extant literature as relevant drivers for firms’ environmental performance. These are: the natural log 
of company’s total annual revenues (REV), as a proxy for size (Gonzales-Benito and Gonzales-
Benito, 2006) and company’s return on equity (ROE). Some differences in environmental 
performance may arise from these factors: we therefore controlled in order to isolate the unique 
contribute of board structure and composition. 
The definition and measurement of all the variables used in the analysis are summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
Tab. 1: Definition and measurement of variables 
 
Group Code Variable Measurement Predicted sign 
Dependent Variable 
   
 
CSRHubENV Environmental Performance CSRHUB 2015 
 Independent Variables 
   
 
SIZE Board Size Number of board members + 
 
NON-EX Non Executive directors 
% of non-executive directors in the 
board + 
 
IND Independent directors 
% of independent directors in the 
board + 
 
CRITICAL MASS Gender diversity 
1= if the number of woman on 
board >3; 0= otherwise + 
Control Variables 
   
 
REV Revenues in 2015 
Natural logarithm of the revenues 
in 2015 ($)  + 
 
ROE Return on Equity 
Company’s Return on Equity in 
2015 + 
Source: our elaboration 
 
 
                                                          
1
  As stated on the csrhub.com website: “The Environment category data covers a company’s interactions with the 
environment at large, including use of natural resources, and a company’s impact on the Earth’s ecosystems. The 
category evaluates corporate environmental performance, compliance with environmental regulations, mitigation of 
environmental footprint, leadership in addressing climate change through appropriate policies and strategies, energy-
efficient operations, and the development of renewable energy and other alternative environmental technologies, 
disclosure of sources of environmental risk and liability and actions to minimize exposure to future risk, 
implementation of natural resource conservation and efficiency programs, pollution prevention programs, 
demonstration of a strategy toward sustainable development, integration of environmental sustainability and 
responsiveness with management and the board, and programs to measure and engage stakeholders for 
environmental improvement.” 
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The sample used in the study consists of the Italian and Spanish companies that were included 
in the CSRHub in 2015. We decided to focus the attention on the companies based in these 
countries because they belong to non Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems, with generally 
one-tier systems and comparable ownership and board structures. It is in fact interesting to 
understand how the relationship between boards and corporate environmental performance plays 
out in firms with controlling shareholders. 
After merging CSRHub data with companies’ board information availability, we had a sample 
of 87 firms, 54% of them based in Italy. 
The majority of these companies operate in banking, financial and utility industries, while only 
21 companies operate in ICT, construction and chemical industries (Figure 1).  
 























4. Results and Discussion 
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we explain variations in firms’ environmental performance 
using two regression models, conducted with SPSS 23, where board structure and composition 
variables constitute the primary explanatory variables. This methodology has been used to predict 
the relationships between several variables and different metrics of environmental engagement or 
performance, so it appears to be an appropriate method of analysis. 
Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlation coefficients of the variables used in our analysis 
are presented in Table 2. 
 
Tab. 2: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation 
 
  Mean Std Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) CSRHubENV  61.58 10.34 1.00 
     
  
(2) SIZE  12.61 3.51 -0.04 1.00 
    
  
(3) NON-EX 0.80 0.11 .302** 0.17 1.00 
   
  
(4) IND 0.48 0.16 .211* -0.03 .228* 1.00 
  
  
(5) CRIT MASS 0.18 0.39 -0.03 .436** .241* 0.20 1.00 
 
  
(6) REV 8.39 1.56 .344** 0.11 .299** 0.17 0.11 1.00   
(7) ROE 30.36 244.60 0.08 -0.10 0.09 0.09 0.19 -0.06 1.00 
**. Significant at 0.01 (2-tails); *. Significant at 0.05 (2-tails) (Pearson's index) 
  
Source: our elaboration 
 
The average value of the CSRHubENV is 61.58, with a standard deviation of around 10.34. As 
regards the independent variables, the average size of the board of directors is around 12 members. 
Regarding board composition, the presence of non-executive directors is larger than the 
independent ones: the average percentage of the first typology in the board is around 80%, while 
independent directors cover on average 48% of the total board. Conversely, the presence of women 
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in the board is quite low: only 18% of the sample companies have more than 3 women on board 
and, as expected, it often occurs in larger board. 
The Pearson’s correlation reveals a significant positive correlation between the CSRHub 
indicator (CSRHubENV) and the percentage of non-executive directors (0.3026; p-value <0.01) and 
independent directors (0.211 ; p-value <0.05). The CSRHubENV is also positively correlated with 
revenues (0.344, p-value <0.01). 
For investigating the relationship between board structure and composition and firms’ 
environmental performance, we developed two OLS regression models (Table 3): the first model 
considers only the effect of board characteristics on CSRHub, while in the second model the control 
variables are inserted.  
 
Tab. 3: Regression Results 
 
    MODEL 
    1 2 
CONSTANT B 37.395** 27.900** 
  Std. Error 9.547 10.053 
SIZE B -0.099 -0.053 
  Std. Error 0.386 0.384 
NON-EX B 25.690* 19.322* 
  Std. Error 10.875 10.888 
IND B 10.940 8.584 
  Std. Error 7.146 7.020 
CRITICAL MASS B -2.522 -3.334 








  Std. Error   0.005 
R-SQUARED   0.117 0.186 
F   2.525 2.815 
**p < .01; *p< .05: 
   
Source: our elaboration 
 
Regression results for Model 1 show that board size (SIZE) has a non significant negative 
impact on CSRHubENV, thus Hypothesis 1 cannot be supported by the analysis. The result is 
therefore not consistent with the resource dependence theory and with the provisions of de Villiers 
et al. (2011). Large boards are likely to possess the bundle of competencies and expertise required 
to enhance corporate decisions, but if they are too big they probably loose efficiency and efficacy. 
We also failed to find any relationship between firms’ environmental performance and the 
critical mass of women on the board (CRITICAL MASS), contrary to the bulk of prior research on 
the relationship between women directors and CSR (Walls et al., 2012; Post et al., 2015; Kassinis et 
al., 2016; Li et al., 2017). The relationship is also not correctly signed; as this result may sound 
quite unconventional in comparison to previous literature, future investigations will be required. 
Maybe, in firms with majority shareholders, the influence of blockholders on board’s decisions is 
prevailing; this is consistent with the idea that majority shareholders may use board directors (also 
women directors), to help advance their agenda, at the expense of minority shareholders. 
On the contrary, consistent with Hypothesis 3 and the mainstream literature, we found a 
positive relation between CSRHubENV and the percentage of non-executive directors in the board 
(NON-EX), while the association with the percentage of independent (Hypothesis 4) in the board is 
not significant, even if correctly signed. The result follows the agency theory and provides evidence 
of the monitoring role of the board, as already reported by Johnson and Greening (1999). As the 
number of non executive directors on a board increases, the ability of directors to control 
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management’s activities towards environmental issues tends to be higher; such directors are in fact 
able to fully exploit their monitoring function, even in firms with controlling shareholders. 
Considering control variables (model 2), the regression fit increased (R-Squared= 0.186). 
Among the drivers, only firm’s revenues, considered as a proxy of a company’s size (REV = 1.805) 
and the percentage of Non executive directors (NON-EX= 19.322) positively affect environmental 
performance, confirming previous results. Environmental performance, in particular, seems to 
become an issue in larger firms, which have a greater set of stakeholders. 
At the end of our analysis, some robustness checks have been carried out in order to validate 
the empirical results and to disclose their consistency. Firstly, we controlled for the standard and 
studentized residuals of regression: they fell inside the acceptable values, making us ascertain that 
outliers do not invalidate our statistical results. We also controlled for multicollinearity bias using 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) after each regression, aiming at avoiding the risk of suppressor 
effects in multiple regression analyses (Hair et al., 1998). Since the values were within acceptable 





The present paper addresses the nature and intensity of the relations existing between board 
structure and composition and firms’ environmental performance. 
In this regard, founding on agency theory and resource dependence theory assumptions, the 
manuscript investigates the role of board size and board composition (gender critical mass, non 
executive and independent directors) in affecting the environmental performance of a sample of 
Spanish and Italian firms rated by CSRHub in 2015. 
Indeed, the results of the three OLS regression models provide nuanced evidence that boards do 
affect firms’ environmental performance. Our main findings suggest in fact a positive relationship 
between the presence of non executive directors in the board and companies’ environmental 
performance; while the critical mass of women directors and the percentage of independent 
directors, together with board size, do not seem to be related with firms’ green performance. In 
countries where controlling shareholders prevail, large owners may use their control to appoint 
managers and directors that are aligned with them, making decisions in their favour and, as 
supervisors, not questioning their decisions in order to follow their goals. Board’s independency 
becomes in this way an important driver for following strategies that satisfy stakeholders’ interests. 
Our study presents some limitations that may be ironed out in future studies. The first limitation 
is related to the choice of a sample with a small number of observations, related to the presence of 
the firms in the CSRHub database. Moreover, a longitudinal analysis will probably provide more 
confidence in the findings than in our cross-sectional analysis, answering a call by recent CSR 
scholars for more longitudinal research in this area (Rao and Tilt, 2016). Finally, female 
representation on boards is only one instance of board diversity: the interplay between female 
representation and other types of diversity such as age, for example, should also be of interest. 
Despite such limitations, however, this contribution provides some valuable research implications, 
useful for researchers and academics. 
The study reveals several theoretical implications, both in corporate governance and ONE 
streams of research. 
As regards corporate governance literature, our study provides nuanced evidence that board 
composition influences the direction of company’s strategic path, in firms with controlling 
shareholders. Only outside directors seem to have a positive influence on corporate environmental 
performance, highlighting the crucial role of board independency in countries where such type of 
ownership structure prevails. 
At the same time, our results suggest that in Latin countries, such as Italy and Spain, the female 
representation on boards does not seem to be associated to higher environmental performance: in 
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both countries the number of women on board is probably too low and they rarely occupy strategic 
positions (such as CEO or Chairman). 
ONE literature may also be enriched by the study, as we identified non-executive directors as 
an important internal driver of firms’ environmental performance, advancing knowledge in the 
understanding of its antecedents. 
Finally, also managers and public authorities could benefit from this knowledge, as the results 
allow to identify the characteristics of the board that may foster and enforce firms’ environmental 
performance. Companies, in fact, may play a significant role in the reduction of man activities’ 
impact on natural environment and in the promotion of a more ecologically sustainable world. 
Moreover, socially responsible funds could find useful, for their portfolio allocation strategy, to 
know if there are types of directors more oriented to green issue. Global institutional investors are, 
in fact, increasingly using environmental management and disclosure as a proxy for good 
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